Between Banyans and battle scenes: liberal norms, contestation, and the limits of critique by Wolff, Jonas & Zimmermann, Lisbeth
www.ssoar.info
Between Banyans and battle scenes: liberal norms,
contestation, and the limits of critique
Wolff, Jonas; Zimmermann, Lisbeth
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK)
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Wolff, J., & Zimmermann, L. (2016). Between Banyans and battle scenes: liberal norms, contestation, and the limits of
critique. Review of International Studies, 42(3), 513-534. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210515000534
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70257-9
Review of International Studies (2016), 42, 513–534 © 2015 British International Studies Association
doi:10.1017/S0260210515000534 First published online 15 Dec 2015
Between Banyans and battle scenes: Liberal
norms, contestation, and the limits of critique
JONAS WOLFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN*
Abstract. In studying the global spread and implementation of liberal norms, scholars have
moved from linear notions of norm diffusion and promotion to an emphasis on norm
contestation. Contestation by the supposed beneficiaries and addressees has taken centre
stage in both research on the norms that underpin global governance and in studies on
democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding. While the impetus of this scholarship
is normative – to overcome the taken-for-granted nature of liberal norms – the concept of
contestation itself is mainly used with an analytical interest. Yet, as we show in this article,
contestation also comes with – oftentimes implicit – normative connotations. Focusing on
the seminal work of Milja Kurki, Oliver Richmond, Antje Wiener, and Amitav Acharya, we
reconstruct these normative connotations. It turns out that the normative take on contestation
is fairly conventional in all four approaches. Contestation is largely seen as a means to
enable dialogue, as illustrated by Acharya’s metaphor of the Banyan tree. Fundamental
conflicts over liberal norms (‘battle scenes’) are either not considered or seen as normatively
undesirable. As a way forward, we propose a typology that enables scholars to empirically
analyse contestation in its different expressions and suggest two strategies to normatively
assess practices of contestation.
Jonas Wolff is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and teaches
at Goethe University Frankfurt and Kassel University. He is member of the German Research
Network ‘External Democracy Promotion’ (EDP) and co-editor of The Comparative
International Politics of Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2014). His research focuses
on Latin American politics, contentious politics, and international democracy promotion.
Lisbeth Zimmermann is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).
She is also affiliated with the ‘Formation of Normative Orders’ Cluster of Excellence at
Goethe University Frankfurt. Her main research interests are: norms in international relations;
peacebuilding and the promotion of democracy; and normative questions relating to
democracy and legitimacy in global governance. She has recently published ‘Same same or
different? Norm diffusion between resistance, compliance, and localization in post-conflict
states’, International Studies Perspectives (2014).
Introduction
There is an increasing awareness among scholars that study international norms that
these norms and their intrinsic universality cannot be taken for granted. The debate
* Previous versions of this article were presented in August 2014 at the Fourth Global International Studies
Conference in Frankfurt/Germany and in March/April 2014 in a Workshop on ‘Pragmatic Peace-
building’ at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Warsaw/Poland. We thank Amitav Acharya, Pol Bargués
Pedreny, Lothar Brock, David Chandler, Katja Freistein, Piki Ish-Shalom, Beate Jahn, Chris Hobson,
Milja Kurki, Anton Peez, Oliver Richmond, the participants of the ‘Pragmatic Peacebuilding’Workshop
and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Lisbeth Zimmermann acknowledges the support
by the DFG funded Cluster of Excellence ‘Normative Orders’ at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
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has turned from a focus on norm diffusion to an interest in norm contestation and
related discussions about norm localisation, appropriation, and subsidiarity.1 Critical
debates related to the topic have also emerged in the research on international
democracy promotion and (liberal) peacebuilding: They likewise point to the
contested nature of the concepts of ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘liberal peace’ as well
as to actual processes of contestation of and resistance against the practices guided by
these normative templates.2
At first sight, contestation, in these debates, is used as an analytical, descriptive
concept; according to most authors, those liberal concepts and paradigms are
normative that are met with contestation. Yet, as we argue in this article, upon closer
examination, contestation also has strong normative connotations. As we will
demonstrate below, those scholars that empirically study and theoretically
emphasise the relevance of contestation at the same time normatively call for
recognising, facilitating, and promoting contestation. They usually see contestation as
having democratic qualities itself: Formerly passive ‘objects’ of international
governmentality gain voice, struggles over the concept of democracy facilitate
1 See Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional
change in Asian regionalism’, International Organization, 58:2 (2004), pp. 239–75; Amitav Acharya,
Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009);
Amitav Acharya, ‘The R2P and norm diffusion: Towards a framework of norm circulation’, Global
Responsibility to Protect, 5:4 (2013), pp. 466–79; Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, ‘Things we
lost in the fire: How different types of contestation affect the validity of international norms’, PRIF
Working Paper 18, available at: {http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/PRIF_WP_18.pdf} accessed
10 December 2013; Anja Jetschke and Andrea Liese, ‘The power of human rights a decade after: From
euphoria to contestation?’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent
Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), pp. 26–42; Antje Wiener, ‘Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of
world politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 10:2 (2004), pp. 189–234; Antje Wiener, The
Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (Berlin: Springer, 2014); Lisbeth
Zimmermann, Global Norms with a Local Face? The Interaction of Rule of Law Promotion and Norm
Translation in Guatemala (unpublished PhD thesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt, 2012); Lisbeth
Zimmermann, ‘Same same or different? Norm diffusion between resistance, compliance, and localization
in post-conflict states’, International Studies Perspectives (Online First: DOI:10.1111/insp.12080, 2014);
Susanne Zwingel, ‘How do norms travel? Theorizing international women’s rights in transnational
perspective’, International Studies Quarterly, 56:1 (2012), pp. 115–29.
2 See, among others, Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, Democracy Promotion: A Critical Introduction
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); David Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity:
Rethinking “hidden” agency and “resistance”’, Peacebuilding, 1:1 (2013), pp. 17–32; David Chandler
and Oliver Richmond, ‘Contesting postliberalism: Governmentality or emancipation?’, Journal of
International Relations and Development, 18:1 (2015), pp. 1–24; Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki
(eds), The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2012); Milja Kurki,
‘Democracy and conceptual contestability: Reconsidering conceptions of democracy in democracy
promotion’, International Studies Review, 12:3 (2010), pp. 362–86; Milja Kurki, ‘Human rights and
democracy promotion: Reflections on the contestation in, and the politico-economic dynamics of, rights
promotion’, Third World Quarterly, 32:9 (2011), pp. 1573–87; Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures:
Re-Visioning Democracy Promotion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver
P. Richmond, ‘Myth or reality: Opposing views on the liberal peace and post-war reconstruction’, Global
Society, 21:4 (2007), pp. 491–7; Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The local turn in peace
building: a critical agenda for peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34:5 (2013), pp. 763–83; Annika E. Poppe
and Jonas Wolff, ‘The normative challenge of interaction: Justice conflicts in democracy promotion’,
Global Constitutionalism, 2:3 (2013), pp. 373–406; Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal
peace’, Millennium, 38:3 (2010), pp. 665–92; Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London:
Routledge, 2011); Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, ‘Peacebuilding and critical forms of agency:
From resistance to subsistence’, Alternatives, 36:4 (2011), pp. 326–44; Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (ed.),
Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives (London: Routledge, 2011); Jonas
Wolff, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds), The Comparative International Politics of
Democracy Promotion (London: Routledge, 2014).
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deliberation and self-determination,3 and resistance against liberal peacebuilding
creates space for emancipatory processes.4 Contestation, thereby, becomes itself a
normative concept.
This normative quality of contestation is, however, rarely spelt out.
Correspondingly, the normative consequences – and tensions – implied by the
emphasis on, and call for, contestation remain unaddressed. While the scholarship on
contestation is generally characterised by a high degree of (self-)reflexivity, this critical
attitude has yet to be extended to the very concept of contestation. In order to
contribute to such an extension, this article works out the different normative uses of
the concept of contestation in the literature on norm contestation, with a particular
focus on challenges to the global spread and worldwide implementation of liberal
norms.5 Because such a study needs an in-depth analysis of implicit notions linked
to the concept of contestation in specific works, we focus on four influential
contributions to this literature that represent different research foci and theoretical
perspectives: the research on contested models of democracy in democracy promotion
by Milja Kurki; the work on resistance to liberal peacebuilding by Oliver Richmond;
the work on norm contestation by Antje Wiener; and the study of norm localisation
by Amitav Acharya.
In reconstructing the normative – in fact, often democratic – claims that are
linked to contestation in the work of these four authors, we argue that the notions
of contestation used (or implied) by these scholars are, first, surprisingly similar.
Second, they are fairly conventional in terms of democratic theory and, third,
can generally be located within the broad liberal mainstream of approaches to
global governance.
An exploration of the normative meanings attached to the concept of contestation
is currently still missing in International Relations (IR).6 In analysing the normative
and functional justification, the (implicit) limits and preferred modes of contestation,
we show that contestation in the studies under consideration is largely seen as a means
which ideally leads to inclusive dialogue with norm promoters under the Banyan tree
(a metaphor introduced by Amitav Acharya). Battle scenes – that is, conflicts over
promoted norms of a more fundamental and radical kind – are either not considered
or seen as normatively undesirable. This narrow focus on contestation as intra-
systemic opposition sits uneasily with the very aim of the literature on contestation,
which, in general terms, shares a critical perspective on the existing global order. To
the extent that the interest in contestation emerges from a position that ‘does not take
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question’,7
one cannot simply demarcate supposedly ‘good’ contestation (that is normatively
3 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. 4.
4 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, p. 149.
5 In this article, we do not use a fixed definition of liberal norms but relate more generally to the contested
range of liberal conceptions of political order and (good) governance as used in contemporary international
relations (the topic) and International Relations (the discipline) that include the set of norms associated with
liberal models of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.
6 A liberal core of post-liberal peacebuilding research has, however, already been identified by postcolonial
scholars. As Sabaratnam argues, post-liberal critiques are ‘trapped in a “paradox of liberalism”’. Meera
Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace’, Security Dialogue, 44:3 (2013),
p. 270. See also David Chandler, ‘Resilience and the “everyday”: Beyond the paradox of “liberal peace”’,
Review of International Studies, 41:1 (2015), pp. 38–9; Suthaharan Nadarajah and David Rampton, ‘The
limits of hybridity and the crisis of liberal peace’, Review of International Studies, 41:1 (2015), pp. 49–72.
7 This is part of Robert Cox’s famous definition of critical theory (as opposed to ‘problem-solving theory’).
Robert W. Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory’,Millennium,
10:2 (1981), p. 129.
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desirable and capable of being integrated into the given normative order) from other
(radical, disruptive, irreconcilable) forms of resistance. In discussing these limitations
of existing approaches, we argue for a broader perspective on contestation that also
considers radical expressions of dissent and explicitly recognises the normative
tensions that are associated with any critical perspective on contestation.
The article first briefly summarises the turn to contestation (and to related
concepts such as resistance) in current IR debates. In doing so, we also clarify our
usage of the term and justify the selection of the four authors mentioned above. The
respective approaches to contestation developed by Kurki, Richmond, Wiener, and
Acharya are assessed in four consecutive sections. Then, we compare the four
approaches, discuss differences and commonalities, and contrast them with
perspectives on critique, opposition, and resistance in IR and democratic theory
more generally. We conclude by proposing a typology of contestation that enables
scholars to empirically analyse the phenomenon in its different expressions and
suggest two strategies of dealing with the difficult question of how to normatively
assess practices of contestation.
Contestation in IR: A brief overview of current debates
The recent turn to research on contestation in IR has emerged in two related but
separate research areas. First, since the early 2000s, scholars interested in the
dynamics and meanings of norms that underpin the current global order have
increasingly emphasised the relevance of contestation in international politics.
Predominant approaches that focused on norm diffusion and compliance were seen
as too dichotomous, linear, and static. The emphasis on contestation was based
on a more complex understanding of the dynamics involved in the spread,
instutionalisation, and application of global norms.8 Influential contributions to
this debate were made by Amitav Acharya and Antje Wiener. Focusing on regional
norm dynamics in non-Western/Third World contexts, Acharya introduced the
concepts of ‘norm localisation’ and ‘norm subsidiarity’ to describe potential outcomes
of norm contestation beyond full norm adoption or mere rejection.9 This inspired a
vibrant research branch looking into the adaptation and translation of norms between
global, regional, domestic, or local contexts.10 Wiener, in contrast, has worked
primarily on norm contestation within Europe and at the global level.11 She represents
a group of scholars that look at contestation with the aim of analysing the changing
8 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’; Charlotte Epstein, ‘Stop telling us how to behave: Socialization or
infantilization?’, International Studies Perspectives, 13:2 (2012), pp. 135–45; Mona L. Krook and Jacqui
True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: the United Nations and the global promotion of
gender equality’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:1 (2012), pp. 103–27; Wiener, ‘Contested
compliance’. For overviews of this scholarship, see Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, ‘Things we lost in the fire’;
Zimmermann, Global Norms with a Local Face?; Zimmermann, ‘Same same or different?’.
9 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’; Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?; Amitav Acharya, ‘Norm subsidiarity and
regional orders: Sovereignty, regionalism, and rule-making in the Third World’, International Studies
Quarterly, 55:1 (2011), pp. 95–123.
10 See Jürgen Rüland and Karsten Bechle, ‘Defending state-centric regionalism through mimicry and
localisation: Regional parliamentary bodies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
Mercosur’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 17:1 (2014), pp. 61–88; Zwingel, ‘How do
norms travel?’; and the overviews in Zimmermann, Global Norms with a Local Face?; Zimmermann,
‘Same same or different?’.
11 Wiener, ‘Contested compliance’; Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics; Wiener, A Theory of
Contestation.
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meanings and interpretations of norms of global governance.12 One of her major
contributions to this field of research is the emphasis on the ‘dual quality’ of norms –
stable on the one hand, and contested and dynamic on the other.13
A second area of research that has seen a turn to contestation concerns the diverse
practices of international intervention into what had traditionally been regarded the
internal affairs of states. Most notably, a rich critical scholarship has emerged
in recent years that empirically analyses and normatively questions ‘liberal
peacebuilding’.14 A similar, if less vibrant, debate concerns the related practice of
external democracy promotion.15 In both cases, the emphasis on contestation (or
resistance) responded to a mainstream perspective that regarded the liberal norms
supposed to be implemented through such international interventions as universally
valid. Oliver Richmond is certainly one of the protagonists of the former debate. His
main contributions centre around a critical analysis of the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm, an
emphasis on local agency in peacebuilding contexts with a particular focus on
resistance, and, most recently, a discussion of hybrid variants of (‘post-liberal’) peace
that emerge from the encounter of international and local actors in peacebuilding.16
In terms of contestation, Richmond’s starting point is the contestedness of the very
paradigm of the ‘liberal peace’.17 In the debate about democracy promotion, the
corresponding argument has been introduced, most prominently, by Milja Kurki.
Turning attention to the conceptual politics of democracy promotion, she has, in
particular, brought the notion of democracy as an essentially contested concept into
the debate of democracy promotion.18
While Acharya, Wiener, Richmond, and Kurki represent different research areas
in IR, they also refer to very different theoretical positions when trying to make sense
of contestation. Kurki, in her 2013 book, explicitly proposes a ‘synthesis of
Gramscian and Foucauldian theoretical ideas’.19 Richmond also draws frequently
on Michel Foucault, but in addition refers to a broad range of postcolonial and
poststructuralist approaches as well as to the notion of ‘agonistic democracy’ as
proposed by William Connolly or Chantal Mouffe.20 Acharya, in contrast, does not
take any particular stance in terms of political/democratic theory. Yet, his aim to
12 See Krook and True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms’; Wayne Sandholtz, ‘Dynamics of
international norm change: Rules against wartime plunder’, European Journal of International Relations,
14:1 (2008), pp. 101–31; Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, ‘The politics of international norms:
Subsidiarity and the imperfect competence regime of the European Union’, European Journal of Inter-
national Relations, 13:2 (2007), pp. 217–38.
13 Antje Wiener, ‘The dual quality of norms and governance beyond the state: Sociological and normative
approaches to “interaction”’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10:1 (2007),
pp. 47–69.
14 For overviews of this scholarship, see Roger Mac Ginty (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (eds), New
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Tadjbakhsh,
Rethinking the Liberal Peace.
15 For overviews, see Bridoux and Kurki, Democracy Promotion; Hobson and Kurki, The Conceptual
Politics of Democracy Promotion; Poppe and Wolff, ‘The normative challenge of interaction’.
16 See Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘Myth or reality’; Mac Ginty and Richmond, ‘The local turn in peace
building’; Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005);
Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Patterns of peace’, Global Society, 20:4 (2006), pp. 367–94; Richmond, ‘Resistance
and the post-liberal peace’; Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Richmond and Mitchell, ‘Peacebuilding
and critical forms of agency’.
17 Richmond, ‘Patterns of peace’, p. 393; see also Richmond, The Transformation of Peace.
18 Kurki, ‘Democracy and conceptual contestability’. See also Hobson and Kurki, The Conceptual Politics
of Democracy Promotion; Kurki, Democratic Futures.
19 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. 19.
20 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 1, 6, 12, 20, 130.
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overcome a Western and Eurocentric approach to IR theory-making is based on a
strong normative claim for diversity and on a critique of the marginalisation of
knowledge claims of the postcolonial world in International Relations.21 This is again
different from Wiener: In her attempt to bring together debates in IR and
International Law and to carve out a normative argument about contestation in
international relations (see also below), she explicitly draws on James Tully’s
multicultural democratic theory.22
Still, what unites the four authors – and the kind of debates they are part of – is
that they respond to what they see as serious limitations of liberal scholarship: that the
liberal norms of global governance are taken as a given.23 Contestation, therefore, is
put forward as an analytical concept to grasp the diverse practices by which actors –
usually the supposed recipients or followers of the norms in question – dispute the
validity, the meaning or the application of norms. The most precise definition of
‘contestation’ is offered by Wiener. She describes the concept as an ‘interactive
practice’ that involves ‘at least two participating agents’, is ‘generally directed towards
norms (of whatever type)’ and expresses ‘disapproval’ of these norms.24 While this
understanding of contestation as normative contestation suggests that the dispute is
‘mostly expressed through language’, the term also encompasses non-discursive forms
of contention.25 Although the four authors look at different forms and arenas of
contestation and, thus, also emphasise different aspects and issues of contestation,
they by and large share this overall definition (see detailed analysis below).
The four authors exemplify a general trend in IR to study contestation of the
(liberal) global order.26 Their influential role on contestation research in their
respective fields makes it particularly worthwhile to explore the notions of normativity
underpinning their usage of the concept of contestation. As we will show, the
normative and functional justification given for contestation, the (implicit) limits as
well as the preferred modes of contestation that characterise the four approaches are
surprisingly similar. Additionally, despite references to poststructuralism, postcolonial
critique, critical theory or agonist democratic theory, they are generally in line with
mainstream approaches to global governance.
Milja Kurki: Democratically contesting democracy (promotion)
It is far from a new finding that democracy is a contested concept. Still, it was Milja
Kurki and her research team at Aberystwyth University who brought this insight back
into the academic debates on international democracy promotion.27 Her core
21 See Amitav Acharya, ‘Global International Relations (IR) and regional worlds’, International Studies
Quarterly, 58:4 (2014), pp. 647–59; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds), Non-Western International
Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia (London: Routledge, 2010).
22 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, pp. 8–9.
23 See Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’, p. 242; Kurki, ‘Democracy and conceptual contestability’, p. 363;
Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 4–5; Wiener, ‘Contested compliance’, pp. 194–200.
24 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, pp. 12, 1.
25 Ibid., p. 1.
26 For the overall debate, see Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (eds), Liberal World Orders (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013); Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo (eds), After
Liberalism? The Future of Liberalism in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
27 Kurki, ‘Democracy and conceptual contestability’. A second key move that characterises the research
project at Aberystwyth is the deliberate turning away from a narrow, politico-institutional conception of
democracy (and its contestation) towards a broader look at (contested) politico-economic models of
democracy. See Bridoux and Kurki, Democracy Promotion; Kurki, ‘Democracy and conceptual
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contributions to the study of democracy promotion are brought together in her 2013
book Democratic Futures: Re-Visioning Democracy Promotion.28 The volume will be
the main source for the following analysis.
A key analytical starting point of Democratic Futures is ‘the essentially contested
nature of the idea of democracy’.29 This is, first and foremost, not a normative
statement but combines an empirical observation and a theoretical argument:
Empirically, Kurki points to the fact that democracy is ‘highly contested’ in
both democratic theory and democratic practice;30 theoretically, she refers to
W. B. Gallie’s famous argument.31 Yet, given Kurki’s ‘critical theory impetus’,32
the book is not just about analysing the patterns of decontestation that characterise
contemporary democracy promotion. Kurki’s explicit normative aim is to actually
promote contestation of the concept of democracy in the discourse and practice of
democracy promotion.33 Correspondingly, she calls on ‘democracy support actors’ to
embrace ‘clashing sets of values and contestation over democracy and democracy
support’.34
In essence, this applies the very democratic standards of pluralist debate that
supposedly guide democracy promoters to their own practice.35 Still, just as
democratic theorists discuss whether and which kinds of procedural and/or
substantive limits to contestation are needed in order to uphold democracy,36 the
political plea for (accepting) conceptual contestation in democracy promotion is
confronted with the crucial question of the limits of normatively acceptable
contestation. Is any claim to some kind of democracy equally valid or legitimate?
Are there basic standards that delimit what can be plausibly claimed to be a
democratic model of political order or a democratic set of rights? Are there any
procedural requirements for legitimate contestation in the sense that any actor that
wants to engage in contestation must do so through certain institutional channels
or, at least, has to respect certain procedural standards (for example, to limit
contestation to non-violent or discursive contestation, or to accept that others are
equally entitled to contest one’s own contestatory practice)? The plea for contestation
in democracy promotion, therefore, raises the related questions of whether there are
any normative standards that demarcate (legitimate) contestation either in terms of
contestability’; Kurki, ‘Human rights and democracy promotion’; Milja Kurki, ‘Locating the normative
within economic science: Towards the analysis of hidden discourses of democracy in international
politics’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 16:1 (2013), pp. 55–81; Hobson and Kurki,
The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion.
28 Kurki, Democratic Futures.
29 Ibid., p. 12.
30 Ibid.
31 See W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially contested concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1956),
pp. 167–98.
32 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. 3.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
34 Ibid., p. 257, emphasis in original.
35 In this sense, Hobson and Kurki have explicitly put forward the ‘normative claim … that democracy
promotion should be understood and practiced in a pluralist manner’. Christopher Hobson and Milja
Kurki, ‘Conclusion: Reflections on a new approach in a new era of democracy promotion’, in Hobson
and Kurki (eds), The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion, p. 215, emphasis in original. See also
Teivo Teivainen, ‘The pedagogy of global development: the promotion of electoral democracy and the
Latin Americanisation of Europe’, Third World Quarterly, 30:1 (2009), pp. 163–79.
36 See Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Larry Diamond,
‘Three paradoxes of democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 1:3 (1990), pp. 48–60; Jürgen Habermas,
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1996).
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substance (the democratic quality of the models articulated) or procedure (the
democratic quality of the form contestation takes).
Interestingly, this twofold problematique is not dealt with in the book, but there
are quite a few implicit indications of what Kurki has in mind when arguing in favour
of contestation. For instance, the models of democracy she discusses that go beyond
the liberal democratic model and its variants include ‘the socialist “delegative” model
and the social democratic model’, ‘participatory’ and ‘radical’ democracy as well as
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘global’ democracy.37 The same selectivity applies to the
concluding discussion in which Kurki, for instance, mentions ‘social democracy or
participatory democracy’38 and ‘radical or cosmopolitan democracy’.39 According to
Kurki, this selection of models is ‘partially arbitrary’ and only aims at ‘an opening
gambit to pluralisation of thought on democracy’.40 Most plausibly, however, the
selection is not in fact arbitrary but rather norm-guided. There are certainly very good
reasons why Kurki recommends that democracy promoters read Marx, Pateman,
Galbraith, Hobhouse or Mill, but not Schmitt or Stalin.41 Yet these reasons are not
explicitly stated – and they cannot simply consist of the fact that the latter two are not
generally considered to have put forward any kind of democratic theory, because this
would immediately evoke the question of who, and based on which normative criteria,
decides over the legitimate range of models of democracy.42 In this sense, the range of
‘democratic alternatives in the fullest possible sense’43 that democracy promoters need
to encourage is certainly not without limits. But it remains unclear what these limits
are. In another contribution co-authored with Chris Hobson, Kurki clarifies that even
when one recognises ‘a plurality of potential kinds of democracy’, ‘Russia can still be
criticised for its inadequate democratic credentials’.44 But the question remains
whether this means ‘inadequate’ in terms of one particular (contested and, thus,
contingent) concept of democracy or ‘inadequate’ in a more general sense of
normative standards that any democracy should fulfill.45
The second dimension of the problem concerns the legitimate ways in which, and
mechanisms through which, contestation of democracy can be voiced. Kurki’s ‘policy
provocations’46 suggest that democracy promoters listen to diverging voices and
engage in dialogue of some kind. But the plea for listening and dialogue is not
politically innocent because it immediately raises questions related to the selection of
participants and the rules governing such a dialogue: Who is entitled to participate?
Who invites and selects? What are the procedures? And who, in turn, decides on them?
37 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. 28.
38 Ibid., p. 227.
39 Ibid., p. 242.
40 Ibid., p. 29.
41 Ibid., p. 256.
42 Generally speaking, the question whether a given conception of political – or politico-economic – order is
explicitly called ‘democratic’ can hardly be used as a normative standard for selecting legitimate alter-
natives to liberal democracy. In the cases of Schmitt and Stalin, it would be difficult to dispute that their
conceptions of political order are undemocratic, but this does only show that there has to be some kind of
normative criteria for demarcating the field of contestation of democracy.
43 Kurki, Democratic Futures, p. 263.
44 Hobson and Kurki, ‘Conclusion’, p. 221.
45 On this general problematique and the difficulty of distinguishing ‘between genuine opposition to Western
imperialism and the cynical abuse of pro-democracy rhetoric by authoritarian regimes’, see Viatcheslav
Morozov (ed.), Decentring the West: The Idea of Democracy and the Struggle for Hegemony (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2013). The quotation is from the introduction: Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Introduction: Locating
international democracy’, in Morozov, Decentring the West, p. 15.
46 Kurki, Democratic Futures, ch. 12.
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Oliver Richmond: Emancipatory resistance to the liberal peace
Just as Milja Kurki emphasises the contestedness of democracy, Oliver Richmond
points to the contested nature of liberal peace.47 While Kurki criticises democracy
promoters for not taking into account alternative conceptions of democracy,
Richmond argues that contemporary peacebuilding does not recognise ‘contestation
via local agency’:48 In liberal peacebuilding, ‘difference is only accepted when it
operates within the liberal framework, and cultures and needs are contradictorily
denied’.49 This directly leads to Richmond’s normative goal to not only recognise
and study, but actually promote contestation: With his book A Post-Liberal Peace,
which brings together his main contributions on the topic, Richmond aims to enable
‘the political contestation of externalized and contextual notions of peace, of
governmentality, not to mention of biopolitics’.50
While Richmond thus explicitly uses the term contestation, his preferred terms are
‘resistance’ and ‘critical agency’. Both generally refer to a broad array of practices by
local actors that challenge, work against, reject, co-opt, or usurp international
peacebuilding in some way with the aim to ‘reclaim peacebuilding’.51 As such,
resistance is intrinsically emancipatory vis-à-vis the non-recognition of local agency by
liberal peacebuilding.52 In contrast to Acharya, Kurki and Wiener, however,
Richmond is very explicit in emphasising that the substance and the consequences
of contestation (or resistance) are not necessarily desirable in normative terms.
In criticising any romanticisation of the local, he observes that contestation at the
local level may ‘enable, emancipate, include, exclude, self-determine, marginalize,
silence, or govern’.53 As a consequence, local resistance may also lead to ‘a malevolent
hybridity’ in which liberal peacebuilders make deals with ‘rights-deniers, corrupt
politicians, and warlords’.54 Still, Richmond sees a general tendency for resistance
to be a positive force, offering more potential than risk on the path towards
sustainable peace.55
Upon a closer look, resistance, in Richmond’s argument, does not constitute an
end in itself, but is rather of instrumental value – as a means of enabling participation,
negotiation, dialogue, and/or deliberation. Contestation through critical agency and
resistance is to lead to ‘a constant process of negotiation [that] would have to include a
broad range of voices from the local to the global’.56 The procedural aim is ‘open and
free communication’,57 an ‘interwoven dialogue of peacebuilding’,58 based on
‘meaningful forms of participation for local actors and civil society’.59 Still, while
this reads like a fairly liberal plea for deliberative dialogue, Richmond adds that there
47 Richmond, ‘Patterns of peace’, p. 393. See also Richmond, The Transformation of Peace.
48 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, p. 58.
49 Ibid., pp. 58–9.
50 Ibid., p. 16.
51 Ibid., p. 117.
52 Ibid., p. 149. Richmond explicitly connects his discussion of resistance to peacebuilding to the larger
debate about civil resistance, which clearly has a positive connotation. See Richmond, A Post-Liberal
Peace, p. 119.
53 Ibid., p. 29.
54 Ibid., pp. 184–5.
55 Ibid., p. 144.
56 Ibid., p. 107.
57 Ibid., p. 112.
58 Ibid., p. 215.
59 Ibid., p. 112.
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is ‘considerable skepticism whether Rawlsian liberalism or Habermasian approaches
might be able … to adjust to local needs, identities or traditions at all’.60
Resistance is thus neither good nor bad, but rather an expression of the fact that
chances for meaningful participation are lacking. It is such meaningful participation
that peacebuilders are to work for. In this sense, ‘a liberal peace is effectively
representative of a transitional moment from which a hybridized praxis of peace may
emerge’.61 Once resistance has been successful in opening up (liberal) peacebuilding
along the normative lines identified by Richmond, there is no longer a need to resist or
contest – from then on, dialogue will do the trick, enable local agency and lead, if
successful, to hybrid (local-liberal) contributions to peace.62 Richmond’s notion of a
post-liberal peace thus points to a situation in which hybridity has led both the liberal
peace and ‘its others’ ‘to change while maintaining their differences and localities’;
once such a ‘coexistence of difference’ has been reached, their ‘agonistic relationship’
will dissolve.63
In the end, post-liberal peace is thought of as ‘a via media’ that emerges from the
encounter of ‘local knowledge’ and ‘international prescriptions and assumptions
about peace’.64 Such a hybrid outcome implies a ‘coexistence and renegotiation of
liberal versions of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, development and the
market, all contained by the modern state along with local or customary forms of
governance’.65 According to what Richmond calls his ‘eirenist’ approach,
contestation and resistance can, therefore, in the end be absorbed in a hybridised
version of peace that transforms, but does not replace the liberal peace. This is
possible because the very underpinnings of liberal peace, such as the ‘humanist
concern with social justice and wide-ranging pluralism’,66 facilitate ‘an ethical
re-evaluation of the liberal peace’67 which is to be realised not in the abstract but
through a turn to everyday practices of peacebuilding.68
Still, what demarcates such a via media in normative terms is not explicitly stated.
This may be in line with Richmond’s ‘Eirenism’, but it does not prevent him from
distinguishing, if in rather broad terms, between good and bad (‘malevolent’) forms of
hybrid peace: Emancipation, self-determination and inclusion, for example, are good,
patriarchy, corruption and exclusion are certainly bad.69 In this sense, it is clear that
peacebuilders have a problem when ‘agency does not concur with their liberal
agendas’,70 and that they cannot deny agency – which is, in the end, ‘the basis of all
liberal politics’.71 But if there are better and worse versions of hybridity and peace,
60 Ibid., p. 207. At the same time, Richmond talks about the ‘opportunity for empathic relations to emerge
between the international and the everyday’, which may be embedded in ‘a balancing framework for, say,
Habermasian discourse ethics’. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 133–4.
61 Ibid., p. 113.
62 Ibid., pp. 158–82.
63 Ibid., p. 145.
64 Ibid., p. 104, emphasis in original.
65 Ibid., p. 149. The normative benchmarks used by Richmond are correspondingly vague: ‘self-government,
self-determination, empathy, care’; ‘self-government and self-determination’; or ‘participatory, empathetic,
locally owned and self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically and environmentally speaking’. The
overall aim is a version of peace that ‘would also provide justice and equity, and avoid violence both direct
and structural’. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, pp. 103, 105.
66 Ibid., p. 16.
67 Ibid., p. 15.
68 Ibid., p. 119.
69 Ibid., pp. 147–8.
70 Ibid., p. 132.
71 Ibid.
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then scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding surely cannot be supposed to treat all
kinds of agency and resistance equally.
Antje Wiener: Contestation as a condition for understanding
In contrast to Kurki, Richmond and Acharya, Antje Wiener’s work is explicitly
centred on the concept of contestation. In fact, her most recent book is entitled
A Theory of Contestation.72 Contestation constitutes Wiener’s main analytical
perspective on norms as well as a crucial normative concept in her work. In line
with Tully’s theoretical perspective, she argues that communicative processes of
contestation are both normal and normatively ‘good’73 and should, therefore, be
institutionalised for global norms.74
For Wiener, contestation refers to conflicts over the meaning (or meaning-in-use)
of norms.75 They involve ‘the range of social practices, which discursively express
disapproval of norms’,76 although more implicit forms of contestation are also
included. Depending on the environment where contestation takes place, it can take
the form of arbitration, deliberation, justification, or contention.
Because the meanings of norms are created in interactive processes and are
based on social practices in specific contexts,77 norms are part of endless cycles of
reinterpretation.78 Considering this, the international system presents special
challenges. International norms are generally agreed upon in inter-state negotiation
processes. Yet, in this context, actors might not have overlapping organisational
customs and are thus thrown back to their cultural practices.79
This focus on contestation based on different ‘cultural practices’ emerges from
what she calls an ‘inter-national’ perspective on global politics.80 Wiener strongly
rejects the idea that something like a shared ‘life world’ or a shared value system can
exist at the international level,81 even in the arena of diplomats. This has always been
assumed to be a basic condition for applying the concept of arguing, or more
specifically, Habermasian communicative action, to international relations.82 For
Wiener, ‘culture needs to be taken seriously’83 – although she understands culture as a
dynamic concept. She argues that interaction at an ‘inter-national’ level is always
72 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation.
73 Wiener, ‘Contested compliance’; Wiener, ‘The dual quality of norms and governance beyond the state’;
Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics.
74 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 3. According to Tully’s multicultural democratic theory, contestation,
also of a fundamental kind, is a basic principle of constitutional democracy shaped by diversity. James
Tully, ‘The unfreedom of the moderns in comparison to their ideals of constitutional democracy’,
The Modern Law Review, 65:2 (2002), pp. 204–28.
75 Wiener, ‘Contested compliance’.
76 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 1.
77 Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, p. 4.
78 Ibid., p. 59.
79 Ibid., pp. 29–30; Antje Wiener, ‘Normative baggage in international encounters: Contestation all the
way’, in Oliver Kessler, Rodney Bruce Hall, Cecilia Lynch, and Nicholas Onuf (eds), On Rules, Politics and
Knowledge: Friedrich Kratochwil, International Relations, and Domestic Affairs (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2010), p. 203.
80 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation.
81 See also Antje Vetterlein and Antje Wiener, ‘Gemeinschaft revisited: Die sozialen Grundlagen
internationaler Ordnung’, Leviathan, 41: Special Issue 28 (2013), pp. 78–103.
82 Nicole Deitelhoff, Überzeugung in der Politik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006), pp. 126–8.
83 Hannes Hansen-Magnusson and Antje Wiener, ‘Studying contemporary constitutionalism: Memory,
myth and horizon’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48:1 (2009), p. 39.
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affected by the ‘normative baggage’ of actors, which is different for any individual but
is generally shaped by specific sociopolitical contexts.
According to Wiener, then, norm contestation represents an opportunity – if not a
necessity – for global governance.84 In a major 2004 article, she explicitly argues that
contestation is ‘central for establishing the legitimacy of compliance processes; indeed,
it is constitutive towards social legitimacy’.85 At the same time, however, too
much contestation and contestation at the wrong level can create (dangerous)
international conflict.86 Wiener expects, for example, that situations of immediate
crises can deepen contestation because no time is left for the development of joint
organisational practices and for deliberation.87
Processes of understanding that are part of contestation must, therefore, help
explicate different meanings and interpretations of norms to make it possible to ‘sort
… out the normative baggage’.88 Only such a sorting-out makes international norms
legitimate, as ‘the power of norms depends on the degree to which normative meaning
overlaps in socio-cultural interfaces’.89 The aim, although not explicitly stated, is the
creation of legitimate order by enhancing ‘understanding’ beyond the state.90
Wiener searches for mechanisms to avoid (dangerous) international conflicts and
argues that contestation can help in this regard, especially if it generates organising
principles, that is, norms at a mid-level between abstract general principles, such as
sustainability, and specific rules and regulations, such as net sizes in fishery.91 Yet
contestation only enhances the legitimacy of norms if it is institutionalised
and ‘only under certain conditions such as social interaction in shared context
over a prolonged period of time’.92 Only then can different meanings of norms be
processed and negotiated. Wiener leaves open in which kind of transnational arenas
such negotiation should take place.93 According to Wiener, communication in
transnational arenas requires equal access for, and mutual recognition of, all those
affected by norms.94 In the end, ‘regular contestation would be routinely practiced to
facilitate a bottom-up participation of multiple stakeholders in order to effectively cap
conflict’: Once ‘normativity’ is negotiated at an earlier stage of the compliance
process, ‘misunderstandings or disagreements that are prone to generate conflict
through spontaneous or strategic contestation at a later point in time’ can be
addressed and solved.95
Several points remain to be specified, however. Wiener, for instance, neither clarifies
nor illustrates the potential for conflict that (irregular) contestation implies:96 Does she
84 Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, p. 31; Antje Wiener and Uwe Puetter, ‘The quality of
norms is what actors make of it: Critical constructivist research on norms’, Journal of International Law
and International Relations, 5:1 (2009), p. 7.
85 Wiener, ‘Contested compliance’, p. 218.
86 Wiener, ‘Normative baggage in international encounters’, p. 202; Wiener, A Theory of Contestation,
p. 59.
87 Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, p. 64.
88 Wiener, ‘Normative baggage in international encounters’, p. 203.
89 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 30.
90 Wiener aims at ‘a procedure to account for and identify different understandings and to develop
sustainable agreements’ on global norms. See A Theory of Contestation, p. 43.
91 Ibid., pp. 64–5.
92 Wiener, ‘Normative baggage in international encounters’, p. 203.
93 Wiener, ‘The dual quality of norms and governance beyond the state’, p. 48.
94 Ibid., p. 56; Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, pp. 204–8; Wiener, A Theory of Contestation,
pp. 53, 59.
95 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 53, emphasis in the original.
96 As far as we can see, Wiener also does not specify her understanding of the term ‘conflict’. See Wiener,
‘Normative baggage in international encounters’; Wiener, A Theory of Contestation.
524 Jonas Wolff and Lisbeth Zimmermann
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
02
60
21
05
15
00
05
34
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 H
es
si
sc
he
 S
tif
tu
ng
 F
ri
ed
en
s 
- u
nd
 K
on
fli
kt
fo
rs
ch
un
, o
n 
26
 O
ct
 2
02
0 
at
 1
1:
40
:5
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
refer to violent conflict? Does conflict refer to a radicalisation of contestation, or does
conflict mean that a norm has lost its legitimacy? In addition, we learn little on how
‘understanding’ can be brought about in transnational arenas and how it must be
institutionalised to produce legitimacy, much the same as we learn little about both the
substantive and procedural limits of ‘dialogue’ from the other authors.
While referring specifically to James Tully’s account of democracy and contestation
and, thus, to a democratic theory of a more agonist kind, Wiener’s practical suggestions
for how to deal with contestation still suggest a certain dislike of more adversarial forms
of politics. First, according to her, understanding is always possible (if the right
institutions are available); second, conflict or more fundamental confrontation is to be
avoided; third, shared meanings must be constructed in order to give norms legitimacy.
As a result, according to Wiener, the possibility of ‘constructive’ contestation
leading to shared understanding is empirically uncertain in international politics – but
normatively speaking, it is nonetheless to be aimed for. However, contestation is
not normatively desirable per se, but it is ‘good’ because it is seen as instrumental
for opening up spaces for understanding and for creating a more legitimate
global order.
Amitav Acharya: Dialogue under a Banyan tree
As mentioned above, Amitav Acharya’s research focuses on the processes through
which global norms are interpreted, changed and resisted in new contexts, in
particular in non-Western/Third World regions. The starting point of this ‘norm
dynamic’ is ‘the contestation between emerging transnational norms and preexisting
regional normative and social orders’.97 Such contestation, Acharya argues, regularly
inhibits wholesale acceptance of a given norm (that is, full compliance), while also
often inhibiting outright rejection. Instead, it mostly leads to processes which Acharya
calls ‘localization’: processes of framing and grafting by local actors that give a norm
legitimacy ‘by infusing it with local characteristics and by making it congruent with
the local context’.98 Later, Acharya has complemented this concept of localisation
with a more contentious type of reaction by local actors, namely ‘norm subsidiarity’.99
In this case, contestation leads local actors to reject specific external ideas and try to
establish ‘subsidiary’ norms to counter outside influences or promote other international
norms they consider more universal.
His early work explicitly aimed at providing an analytic framework for
understanding norm transfer. Empirically, his work focuses on regional reactions to
norms and ideas, especially in South East Asia, for example with regard to the diffusion
of the concept of human security. In this context, he describes localisation and
subsidiarity as processes in which contestation by local actors is the main driver.100
Recent considerations on how this framework of localisation and subsidiarity fits
with the diffusion and promotion of human rights norms have – at least implicitly –
strong normative elements. In his latest work, Acharya introduces the metaphor of the
Banyan tree to illustrate human rights diffusion – as an alternative to the well-known
97 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’, p. 241; see also Acharya, ‘Norm subsidiarity and regional orders’, p. 118.
98 Amitav Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents of norm diffusion’, in Rodney Bruce Hall (ed.),
Reducing Armed Violence with NGO Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 101. See also
Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’; Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?
99 Acharya, ‘Norm subsidiarity and regional orders’.
100 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’, p. 251; Acharya, ‘Norm subsidiarity and regional orders’, p. 95.
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boomerang model in IR norm research.101 In the classic boomerang model, human
rights diffusion is brought about by a coalition of domestic human rights
activists, transnational human rights networks, and Western states that use public
shaming and sanctions to pressure a domestic (authoritarian) government to
commit to human rights reforms.102 Acharya criticises this model as painting a
stereotypical picture of Western human rights supporters and non-Western resistors,
and as presenting an overly adversarial style of interaction over human rights as
normality.103 Human rights advancement today, he argues, largely takes place in
an evolutionary manner and is mostly carried out by insider proponents.104 Acharya
thus emphasises the role of non-Western states as ‘norm builders’105 and locates
himself in a philosophical position that stresses that human rights are not a Western
concept but that cognitive priors for human rights can be found around the globe.106
Although his approach is primarily aimed at explaining human rights diffusion,107
he thereby also pursues explicitly normative goals: to ‘recognize that many local
beliefs and practices have robust legitimacy and functionality which should be
recognized and universalized’.108
To illustrate this process, Acharya introduces the Banyan metaphor. The
Banyan is a large Indian tree with aerial roots, which, when they reach the
ground, can grow into part of the trunk and support its large branches. For Acharya,
the Banyan, as a resting place for travellers, symbolises interaction between
the local and the foreign. It is also a cultural symbol and its shadow offers
space for exchange, dispute settlement and consensus-building in village life. Its
large canopy represents the global nature of human rights. With aerial roots
(top-down) and roots which support the branches (bottom-up), the Banyan tree
represents multiple constituencies translating norms and multiple ownership of
human rights.109
As this metaphor shows, Acharya’s ideal of human rights diffusion is an inclusive
two-way interaction of outsiders and insiders, which is not a ‘matter of imposition
101 This metaphor was specifically proposed in the context of human rights norm diffusion. See Amitav
Acharya, ‘From the Boomerang to the Banyan: the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms Reconsidered,
paper prepared for the Conference on Human Rights Futures’, Columbia University, New York,
15 November 2013, made available to us by the author; Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents
of norm diffusion’, p. 108.
102 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
103 Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents of norm diffusion’, pp. 98–103. The same critique would
apply also to the spiral model of international human rights diffusion, including its updated version. See
Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Risse, Stephen
C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to
Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). In the latter volume, the contribution by
Jetschke and Liese explicitly aims at correcting problematic ‘implicit assumptions of the spiral model’ by
taking into account ‘the notion of counter-frames to human rights norms and contestation’ (Jetschke
and Liese, ‘The power of human rights a decade after’, p. 27). Yet, in fact, they do not consider any
meaningful possibility of norm contestation but only two types of normative responses – ‘justifications’
and ‘excuses’ – that do not involve any questioning of the validity of the norms themselves (Jetschke and
Liese, ‘The power of human rights a decade after’, p. 36).
104 Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents of norm diffusion’, pp. 104–8.
105 See also Acharya, ‘The R2P and norm diffusion’.
106 Acharya, ‘From the Boomerang to the Banyan’, p. 8.
107 Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents of norm diffusion’; Acharya, ‘From the Boomerang to
the Banyan’, p. 7.
108 Acharya, ‘From the Boomerang to the Banyan’, p. 21.
109 Ibid.; Acharya, ‘Transnational civil society as agents of norm diffusion’, p. 108.
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through legalistic means and sanctions’110 but based on the principle of dialogue.
Consultation and dialogue are successful mechanisms in which ‘contestations occur’,
but are generally ‘not fatal’.111 In this interaction process, outsiders remain ‘guests not
actors, they bring in new ideas, and new incentives, but it is the locals who buy and
use them’.112
Similar to the other authors, contestation then does not give rise to serious
conflicts, which could not be solved through inclusive dialogue. Contestation is not
expected to include fundamental differences over the validity of norms, but is a
desirable practice that can lead to norm localisation, which makes norms more
legitimate and ensures their functioning in new contexts. Domestic actors are the ones
that decide if and how norms are adopted and localised, but Acharya seems to assume
that they will be happy to localise a context-specific version of globally established
rights, as long as they are not forced to do so by ‘adversarial’ interaction modes of
external actors. This is, at least, what the harmonious image of guests under the
village Banyan tree suggests.
The Banyan metaphor, thus, has a strong normative connotation. Contestation is
supposed to lead to dialogue processes based on which locals can adapt norms to their
specific local context. Fundamental conflicts over norms do not occur. However, it is
not mentioned in Acharya’s texts how locals decide on the adoption or localisation –
or even rejection – of norms, and if limits for contestation exist. In addition, and
similar to Kurki and Richmond, the questions of what ‘dialogue’ means and how it is
supposed to be implemented are left unanswered.
Similar contestation: Banyans instead of battle scenes
The four authors discussed share a critical perspective on the notion that norm
research and norm promotion in international relations deal with clear-cut,
conceptually fixed and universally valid liberal norms. While mainstream liberal
and constructivist scholars tend to treat liberal, including democracy- and human
rights-related norms as normatively unproblematic, these authors emphasise the
contestation of norms. Such contestation is generally seen as theoretically
unavoidable, empirically widespread, and desirable from a normative perspective. It
is this latter question – the normative quality of contestation – that our analysis has
focused on. Table 1 summarises the results from a comparative perspective.
In all four cases, contestation is seen as per se and prima facie a good thing. This
desirability (or even necessity) of contestation is justified, on the one hand, normatively:
in terms of democracy (Kurki), emancipation (Richmond), or legitimacy (Acharya,
Wiener). On the other hand, contestation is also seen as functional for improving
democracy promotion (Kurki), enabling processes of localisation and subsidiarity
(Acharya) or hybridisation (Richmond) as well as for the peaceful establishment of
globally accepted norms (Wiener).
Yet it is also clear that none of the authors advocate a radically relativist position,
that any contestation is good and that every result of contestation is acceptable. All
four cases are characterised by the implicit argument that contestation should
somehow be limited – either regarding its substance or procedurally. Models of
110 Ibid., p. 108.
111 Acharya, ‘From the Boomerang to the Banyan’, p. 27.
112 Ibid.
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democracy may be contested, but such contestation will or should somehow be
confined to the usual models of democracy (Kurki). Liberal peace is hybridised, but
this hybridisation should remain within the limits of a via media between international
standards and local understandings (Richmond). Norms are contested at the
international stage, but more fundamental conflict over norms is either not
expected or is to be avoided by processes of ‘understanding’ in institutionalised
dialogue (Wiener). Norms are localised, but – again – radical alternatives to global
norms are not expected (Acharya). To be sure, Richmond explicitly raises the problem
that contestation or resistance may also be guided by ‘bad’ norms or lead to ‘bad’
results. But it remains unclear how one might systematically distinguish ‘good’
(emancipatory) from ‘bad’ (exclusive, repressive) aims and results of contestation.
Furthermore, we learn little about what is to be done (and by whom) if such a
distinction were to be established and enforced.
In general, all four authors clearly draw some kind of limit to what they regard as
legitimate or desirable contestation – but this limit is neither defined nor justified. Instead,
the authors implicitly distinguish legitimate/just/‘good’ from illegitimate/unjust/‘bad’
contestation by de facto focusing their attention on those forms of contestation that they
themselves regard as legitimate – as if this were the only type of contestation. Thus, none
of the authors covers violent forms of contestation (or contestation that calls for violence)
or a radical questioning of fundamental norms.113 Neither do the authors reflect upon
the possibility that contentious actors might not actually want to enter into a dialogue
with ‘proponents’ of an existing (liberal) global order.
Kurki Richmond Wiener Acharya
Normative
justification of
contestation
Democracy Emancipation International
legitimacy
Local legitimacy
Functional
justification of
contestation
Improving
democracy
promotion
Hybridisation Peaceful
establishment
of globally
accepted
norms
Localisation and
subsidiarity
Limits of
contestation
Typical models
of democracy
Via media
between
international
norms and
local
understandings
Contestation
should not
turn into
(dangerous)
conflict
Radical
contestation not
considered
Preferred modes
of contestation
Dialogue of
democracy
promoters and
addressees
Dialogue of
peacebuilders
and local
actors
Dialogue to
process
contestation in
transnational
fora
Dialogue instead
of adversarial
strategies of
norm promoters
and local actors
Table 1. Comparing the normative notions of contestation
113 Wiener does explicitly exclude ‘violent acts such as for example any form of war, terrorist acts or protest’
– but only because she defines contestation as a practice that ‘is always expressed through language’
(Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 49). This, however, is in tension with the earlier statement that
contestation ‘does not necessarily involve language’ (p. 1). In any case, contestation that includes a call
for violent resistance would be part of the definition. The strong reference to Tully (see Tully, ‘The
unfreedom of the moderns’) also suggests that Wiener does include contestation that questions norms
and normative orders as such. Yet, again, such forms of contestation are not dealt with in her book.
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This largely implicit delimitation of the scope and intensity of contestation, then,
enables the authors to move fairly quickly from a plea for contestation to a call for
deliberation and dialogue, which is always seen as a possible step. In the end, it is not
potentially fundamental disagreement about normative issues that constitutes the
problem, but rather a lack of genuine dialogue or participation. Hence, all four
accounts seem to suggest that the actors involved would only have to seriously talk to
each other. They say little on how this is supposed to happen, however. With the
exception of Acharya, the authors are critical of Habermasian perspectives and
deliberative democracy and theoretically tend towards radical perspectives on
democracy (Connolly, Mouffe, Tully) and, more generally, critical approaches
(Foucault, Gramsci) that rather emphasise power and ideology. Still, the overall call
for deliberation, participation, and dialogue does not fit well with these theoretical
perspectives. Correspondingly, as we will argue in the following section, the four
authors’ positions on contestation are fairly close to mainstream approaches to global
governance. In terms of democratic theory, they combine liberal and deliberative
approaches.
Competing approaches to contestation: Corrective or counter-power
Mainstream approaches to global governance, to the extent that they consider
contestation (or critique, opposition, or resistance) in global politics, do so within the
overarching liberal framework that unites liberal-institutionalist, deliberative, and
cosmopolitan perspectives on world order.114 From such a perspective, the emergence
of contestation results from a lack of legitimacy of certain institutions and practices of
global governance – a legitimacy problem that needs to be overcome by including
critical voices, improving participation and strengthening accountability.115 Accordingly,
theories of global governance are concerned with institutional structures that could
improve the quality of dialogue and increase legitimacy.116 Control mechanisms linked
with epistemic processes – that help understand better what others want, how others
understand democracy/liberal peace, and generate better knowledge – can ensure
renewed legitimacy and efficiency of global order.
Contestation, in these kinds of approaches, is understood in the fairly limited
way of providing a ‘corrective mechanism’, the ultimate aim being to facilitate
‘authentic deliberation’, which would render contestation unnecessary.117
114 See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Anthony McGrew, ‘Models of transnational democracy’, in David Held
and Anthony McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization
Debate (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), pp. 500–13.
115 See Thorsten Thiel, ‘Im Zweifel für den Zweifel: Theoretische Perspektiven auf die Legitimität von Kritik
in der postnationalen Konstellation’ (unpublished manuscript, Frankfurt: Goethe University, 2014).
116 For just a glimpse at this debate, see David Held, ‘Democratic accountability and political effectiveness
from a cosmopolitan perspective’, Government and Opposition, 39:2 (2004), pp. 364–91; Patrizia Nanz
and Jens Steffek, ‘Global governance, participation and the public sphere’, Government and Opposition,
39:2 (2004), pp. 314–35; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Disaggregated sovereignty: Towards the public
accountability of global government networks’, Government and Opposition, 39:2 (2004), pp. 159–90; Iris
Marion Young, ‘Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy’, in Seyla Benhabib
(ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 121–35; Michael
Zürn, ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation-state: the EU and other international institutions’,
European Journal of International Relations, 6:2 (2000), pp. 183–221.
117 Jonathan W. Kuyper, ‘The democratic potential of systemic pluralism’, Global Constitutionalism, 3:2
(2014), pp. 181–2.
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Thus, authors arguing from this perspective assume that institutional representation is
possible, and that the central proposition of deliberative democratic theory for dialogue
holds, although it brings about a host of problems in an international surrounding: In
line with Habermas’ democratic theory,118 dialogue is seen as facilitating the exchange of
reasons, and the participants of such dialogues, based on an intersubjective examination
of reasons, are expected to agree on which reasons are more universalisable.
To be sure, the four authors discussed – implicitly or explicitly – share a critique of
a liberal order in which supposedly non-liberal contestation is effectively marginalised
or silenced. For the authors, contestation per se is normatively desirable, including in
its less rational and more expressive and symbolic forms (especially in the work of
Richmond and Kurki) and as the expression of formerly marginalised postcolonial
voices (Acharya). In addition, Wiener specifically calls for the institutionalisation of
regular contestation at a global level to ensure processes of understanding, although
the vision for the implementation of this call remains vague. But the solution for
contestation remains inclusion through dialogue. In this process, or so it seems,
contestation is primarily instrumental (as a driver of change towards a more inclusive,
pluralist order) and a corrective, and not conceived as at least potentially disrupting
or fundamentally challenging the existing normative order.
The disrupting force of contestation, in contrast, is the concern of so-called radical
approaches to global politics, which draw on agonist or radical democratic theory.119
Here, the assumption of deliberative approaches that reasons can be exchanged in
spaces free of power, without privileging certain positions and without hegemonic
premises what good reasons should and could be, is fundamentally put into
question.120 Scholars associated with these kinds of critical perspectives are not
interested in how to legitimise global order, but search precisely for the processes and
actors that challenge order: for moments of anti-order.121 Contestation, here, is seen
as constituting a counter-power that aims at overcoming an existing, particular – and
in that sense always exclusionary – order.122 Hence, from this perspective, ‘alternative
models of politics which manifest themselves in resistant actions of excluded actors’
are explicitly appreciated.123 Mouffe, for instance, has argued that irreconcilable
ethical differences make conflict a central element of democratic practices.124 In such
agonist approaches, consensus is impossible, difference is constitutive and every
collective political action spontaneous and short-lived. Every attempt to build
and legitimise order will lead to renewed questioning and renewed contestation.
118 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms.
119 See Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Chantal
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London:
Routledge, 2005); Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics And Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2004); Mark Rupert, ‘Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)vision of
the politics of governance/resistance’, Review of International Studies, 29:S1 (2003), pp. 181–98. For an
overview, see also Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy,
Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
120 See Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, ‘Demokratie und Dissens: Zur Kritik konsenstheoretischer Prämissen
der deliberativen Demokratietheorie’, in Hubertus Buchstein (ed.), Die Versprechen der Demokratie
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), pp. 333–4.
121 See also Martin Nonhoff, ‘Demokratisches Verfahren und politische Wahrheitsproduktion: Eine
radikaldemokratische Kritik der direkten Demokratie’, in Buchstein (ed.), Die Versprechen der
Demokratie, p. 318.
122 See, for example, Gill’s concept of the postmodern prince. Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World
Order. See also Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2000); Rancière, Disagreement.
123 Thiel, ‘Im Zweifel für den Zweifel’, p. 4; authors’ translation.
124 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox; Mouffe, On the Political.
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Self-determination can be nothing but a momentous act. In radical approaches, any
kind of long-term institutional embedding of alternity and contestation is refuted. An
institutionalised processing of difference in dialogue is impossible.
In contrast to such radical perspectives, none of the scholars we have discussed
celebrates contestation as a manifestation of counter-power or rejects institutionalisation
as repressive. Instead, although they all criticise narrow conceptions of democracy and
liberal norms and point to more emancipatory processes necessary to include all those
affected, contestation is only seen as a good thing if it can be processed through dialogue
mechanisms leading to more legitimate order. Yet, based on the critical starting point
adopted by the authors discussed, this assumption is not very convincing. Diverging
normative judgments notwithstanding, empirically we simply cannot exclude the
possibility and reality of a radical kind of questioning of the existing order and the
fundamental norms on which it rests.
Banyans and battle scenes: Ways forward
Systematically speaking, there is an easy solution for dealing with this normative
challenge of radical or disruptive contestation. One could simply define contestation
in a way that excludes all those kinds of expressions and forms of critique and
resistance that one regards as illegitimate or ‘negative’. In line, for example, with the
distinction between two forms of resistance – opposition and dissidence125 – one could
argue that contestation is resistance that takes place within the established institutions
and does not fundamentally question them and the basic norms on which they rest.
None of the four authors chooses this strategy. Wiener, at times, moves in this
direction, for instance when she excludes ‘violent acts’ and limits contestation (largely
or exclusively) to discursive practices.126 Contestation, however, would then still
encompass both the questioning of fundamental norms and the existing order and
statements that include a justification or threat of violent resistance.
Given the normative aims of the literature on contestation, the solution to
narrowly (and normatively) define contestation as intra-systemic opposition does,
moreover, not seem very plausible. We propose to conceptually recognise different
types of contestation without a priori attaching an implicit normative assessment to
either type. This will help researchers include the full range of contestation, facilitating
a more sound analysis of the everyday practices of contestation that is both
comprehensive and open to what the actors engaged in contestation actually claim.127
Such a thorough study of contestatory practices also cautions against the quick move
to simply assuming that every contentious actor wants to be integrated into a process
of dialogue and understanding.
In conceptual terms, different types of contestation can be differentiated along
three dimensions. In terms of (1) intensity, contestation ranges from questioning the
ways in which norms are applied to disputing their very validity.128 In terms of
(2) depth, it varies from arguments over specific and/or technical norms to
125 Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand’,
Internationale Dissidenz Working Paper 1 (2014), available at: {http://dissidenz.net/workingpapers/wp1-
2014-daase-deitelhoff.pdf} accessed 28 April 2014.
126 See Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, pp. 1, 49, fn. 113.
127 In a general sense, this is in line with what Boltanski calls a ‘sociology of critique’. Luc Boltanski,
On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
128 Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, ‘Things we lost in the fire’.
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fundamental challenges to basic features of the existing normative order.129 Finally,
the (3) form of contestation ranges from conventional, institutionalised strategies to
(the call for or actual exercise of) unconventional, disruptive practices.130 The most
moderate type of contestation combines the start of the range across all three
dimensions, the most radical one is characterised by the opposite. But, in principle,
any combination is possible.
It might be tempting to identify general criteria that would enable us to clearly
differentiate between legitimate/‘good’ and illegitimate/‘bad’ contestation based on such a
typology. Yet, we do not think this is a viable strategy. As radical approaches to
democratic theory forcefully argue, any authoritative fixation of the limits of legitimate
contestation is both arbitrary and repressive. What is more, there are no endogenous
grounds in the concept of contestation that facilitate distinguishing between various types
of contestation from the point of view of their emancipatory potential – to reframe an
argument made with a view to the concept of hegemony.131 Embedding the concept of
contestation in a particular (normative/democratic) political theory does not help either
because the typology of contestation is simply too abstract. On the one hand, even the
liberal tradition, as represented by John Locke, for example, does provide for a right to
actively, and if need be violently, resist arbitrary government.132 On the other, radical
approaches certainly do not regard all kinds of contestation or resistance as
emancipatory.133 In this sense, what (different kinds of) political theory can do is help
identify core normative standards that may, then, be applied to specific contexts and
practices of contestation in order to enable a theory-guided political judgment. It goes
without saying that, in doing so, research on contestation cannot narrowly look at the
actors engaging in contestation but must be complemented by a normative analysis of
Herrschaft, that is, of the prevalent system of rule: If we are to assess the critical potential
of contestation to particular norms or to an entire normative order, we need to know what
these norms contain, how they came about as well as how they are upheld and enforced.134
Such a critical analysis of contestatory practices, which is based on predefined
normative standards, follows the strategy of critique as ‘measuring’.135 Yet, there is
also an alternative strategy of critique that does not need normative criteria against
which to evaluate contestation.136 From this perspective, emancipation is not a
129 In Wiener’s terminology, the former type of contestation concerns ‘standardised procedures’, the latter
‘fundamental norms’, while ‘organising principles’ occupy an intermediate position. Wiener, A Theory of
Contestation, p. 3.
130 See Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand’; Sidney
Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
131 The original quote reads: ‘There are no endogenous grounds in hegemony theory to differentiate
between various hegemonies from the point of view of their emancipatory potential’. Morozov,
‘Introduction’, p. 10.
132 See John Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), p. 56.
133 David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2005), pp. 238–9.
134 See also Daase and Deitelhoff, ‘Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand’; Stephan
Engelkamp, Katharina Glaab, and Judith Renner, ‘Office hours: How (critical) norm research can regain its
voice’, World Political Science Review, 10:1 (2014), pp. 61–89; Kurki, Democratic Futures, ch. 11.
135 The debates in philosophy centre on the question where such standards can be derived from distinguishing
external, internal, and immanent critique. See, for example, Rahel Jaeggi, ‘Towards an immanent critique
of forms of life’, Raisons Politiques, 57:1 (2015), pp. 13–29.
136 Judith Butler, ‘What is critique? An essay on Foucault’s virtue’, in David Ingram (ed.), The Political:
Readings in Continental Philosophy (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002), pp. 212–26; Michael Mahon,
‘Michel Foucault’s archaeology, enlightenment, and critique’, Human Studies, 16 (1993), pp. 129–41;
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standard against which to measure practices of contestation or an existing order, but
the result of practicing critique itself. Also, approaches pursuing the reconstruction of
critical voices,137 for example in postcolonial and feminist research, aim at this type of
critique: by closely listening to marginalised or dissenting voices, we can emancipate
ourselves, change Western/patriarchal subjectivity and unlearn privileges.138 With a
view to the study of contestation, this, however, also implies that it is not only the
existing order and its ideological underpinnings that are to be deconstructed but also
the very practices of contestation as well as our own attempts at analysing both the
former and the latter.
What the two strategies of critique have in common is that they take contestation
seriously without regarding it as either consistently ‘good’ or necessarily ‘bad’. They
are, therefore, compatible with the broad perspective on contestation suggested above
that, both conceptually and empirically, incorporates the whole range of contestatory
practices. Both approaches, at the same time, are explicit about their own normative
stance. In this sense, they represent two different, but complementary, ways of
advancing the study of contestation in IR.
Conclusion
The recent emphasis on norm contestation in IR research represents a crucial
contribution to the debate about liberal norms, their global spread and worldwide
implementation. The important contributions by Kurki, Richmond, Wiener, and
Acharya as well as the larger critical scholarship they represent demonstrate
convincingly that treating liberal norms as a given openly contradicts those very
norms. Scholars and practitioners that aim at promoting the establishment, diffusion,
and implementation of such norms, therefore, cannot but accept the challenge of
contestation.
Yet, as we have argued in this article, this same challenge also applies to critical
studies on norm contestation. Our reconstruction of the four authors’ approaches to
contestation indicates that they are fairly conventional when it comes to their
normative take on contestation. By implicitly excluding more radical forms of
contestation, they depict contestation as a means to achieve better dialogue and a
more legitimate global order. Thus, in its current formulation, the integration of the
concept of contestation into IR theory is no radical shift away from a liberal
paradigm. Rather, it supports the consolidation of a liberal paradigm in a more
comprehensive form. In this sense, a basic tension in liberal norm research that has
given rise to the very turn to contestation backfires: For a long time, liberal scholars
have struggled with the tension between their universally conceived normative
standards and principles such as local ownership and self-determination – which are
themselves part of these standards but at the same time defy any universalising
mission. Similarly, critical contestation scholars are confronted with the fundamental
problem that their emphasis on the value and need of contestation potentially clashes
with their substantial understandings of emancipation and progress.
Martin Saar, ‘Genealogische Kritik’, in Rahel Jaeggi and Tilo Wesche (eds), Was ist Kritik? (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 2009), pp. 247–65.
137 Engelkamp et al., ‘Office hours’; Sungju Park-Kang, ‘Utmost listening: Feminist IR as a foreign language’,
Millennium, 39:3 (2011), pp. 861–77.
138 Sara Danius, Stefan Jonsson, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘An interview with Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak’, boundary 2, 20:2 (1993), pp. 24–50.
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This tension is, of course, not easy to resolve – and may very well be unresolvable.
Accepting the argument that contestation may also be of a fundamental nature and/or
take disruptive, even violent forms, thus, does not tell us how to normatively assess
this kind of radical questioning. In fact, critical scholars – as long as they remain
committed to some substantive ‘emancipatory’ project – cannot but somehow draw
normative limits and demarcations. But, as we have argued, accepting the challenge
of contestation would require scholars to do at least two things. First, studies of
contestation should not exclude a priori the possibility of a radical kind of questioning
of the existing order and the fundamental norms on which it rests. The typology of
contestation presented in this article offers a conceptual framework that helps
widening the focus on contestation. Second, scholars should explicate – and critically
reflect upon – the implicit normative premises that underlie their analyses of
contestatory practices. As we have argued, such normative reasoning will lead
scholars to neither identify all contestation (of a given type) as generally ‘good’ (as
radical approaches at times seem to suggest), nor as always ‘bad’ (as the liberal
mainstream does). Instead, scholars can identify core normative standards that
systematically and explicitly guide their political assessments of contestatory practices
in a given context and case. Or, they may refrain from making a final judgment at all,
and, by analysing critical voice, aim at emancipating both the scholar and her/his
addressees by disrupting their normalised knowledge about the world. Perhaps the
only general guideline that can be derived from the very emphasis on contestation is
that any normative perspective on contestation has to be both critical vis-à-vis the
contestatory practice at hand and self-critical, that is, open to contestation.139
139 This overall guideline directly draws on David Couzens Hoy, who concludes his discussion of critical
resistance by saying ‘that resistance that was unwilling to be both critical and self-critical would not even
be worth attempting in the first place’. Hoy, Critical Resistance, p. 239.
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